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Being Careful What You Wish For: Divisible Statutes
- Identifying a Non-Deportable Solution to a
Non-Citizen's Criminal Problem
MICHAEL VASTINE*
1. INTRODUCTION
When a non-citizen is arrested, it may be possible for her to
underestimate the full consequences of a criminal charge. The pri-
mary concern of the non-citizen is when she may be released from
custody in order to resume family obligations or return to work before
compromising her standing with an employer. With an immediate
need for release from custody, a quick plea to an offense may be an
attractive option. The non-citizen may not be aware of the immigration
consequences of taking an imprudent plea, the ramifications of which
could far outweigh the inconvenience of additional time in jail follow-
ing an arrest.
Many criminal convictions lead to the institution of removal pro-
ceedings against the non-citizen with the end result being that she
loses her right to remain in the United States. Depending on the
offense and the duration of the non-citizen's residence in the United
States, a waiver may be available to "pardon" the deportable offense
and restore status in the United States. However, in many cases, the
nature of the criminal offense renders the non-citizen deportable as an
"aggravated felon," from which little relief is available. Alternatively,
the non-citizen may not have lived in the United States long enough to
qualify for a waiver. Legislation has increased the number of crimes
classified as aggravated felonies, and investment in national databases
has led to greater apprehension of non-citizens with criminal convic-
tions.1 Consequently, the number of non-citizens ordered deported
* Director of Immigration Clinic and Clinical Instructor, St. Thomas University
School of Law.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (2000). INA
§ 236(d) (2006). Identification of criminal aliens:
(1) The Attorney General shall devise and implement a system-
(A) to make available, daily (on a 24-hour basis), to Federal, State, and
local authorities the investigative resources of the Service to
determine whether individuals arrested by such authorities for
aggravated felonies are aliens;
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from the United States based on convictions for aggravated felonies
has also risen, from 10,303 in 1992 to at least 23,065 in 2006.2
This article addresses recent case examples involving convictions
that, on their face, seemed to provide an adequate basis of
deportability. Convictions under the criminal statutes addressed
herein generally appear to encompass deportable offenses, but have
been held to be insufficient to assure deportability. Therefore, these
examples can serve as templates for analysis of other statutes.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: BASIS OF REMOVAL AND CONTEMPORARY FORMS
OF RELIEF
The so-called "divisibility" analysis is significant since it can be
determinative of whether a ground of deportability or inadmissibility
may be sustained. Thus, successfully arguing divisibility may lead to
terminating removal proceedings against a non-citizen. Since certain
categories of crimes are waivable, it is possible to argue that a non-
citizen is not barred from forms of relief such as a waiver under former
section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Cancella-
tion of Removal, or a waiver of inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the
INA.3 This is significant both as a legal strategy and as a therapeutic
or holistic methodology, since the non-citizen must establish prima
facie eligibility for a waiver before she is permitted to present any testi-
mony or evidence of her equities in the United States. Her alternative
is deportation without ever having the opportunity to present the
human elements of her case.
In its contemporary and most common form, former § 212(c) of
the INA is available for aliens who have been legal permanent residents
(C) which uses computer resources to maintain a current record of
aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony .
(2) The record under paragraph (1)(C) shall be made available-
(A) to inspectors at ports of entry and to border patrol agents at sector
headquarters for purposes of immediate identification of any alien
who was previously ordered removed and is seeking to reenter the
United States, and
(3) Upon the request of the governor or chief executive officer of any State,
the Service shall provide assistance to State courts in the identification of
aliens unlawfully present in the United States pending criminal
prosecution.
2. TRAC Immigration Report, New Data on the Processing of Aggravated Felons,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/175 (last visited January 25, 2007).
3. See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f), INA § 212(c) (1996) (repealed 1996); INA § 212(h), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000); INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2000).
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for seven years, and who pled guilty to an offense prior to April 24,
1996. 4 Section 212(c) relief is barred if the plea was for an aggravated
felony and the alien served more than five years in jail for the crime.'
Relief is also barred if the alien is charged with a ground of
deportability under § 237 of the INA, which does not have a corre-
sponding ground of inadmissibility under § 212.6 Also, a subsequent
conviction may make the alien ineligible for this waiver.7 If an alien is
granted § 212(c) relief, she maintains her lawful permanent resident
status.
Cancellation of Removal for permanent residents under § 240A(a)
of the INA requires that the alien have resided in the United States for
seven years, including at least five years as a permanent resident, but
aggravated felonies serve as a bar to this form of relief." Cancellation
of Removal for non-permanent residents under § 240A(b) requires ten
years presence in the United States, "good moral character," and a
showing that denial and removal would result in "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" to a citizen or resident spouse, child, or
parent.9 Criminal grounds of deportability provide a statutory bar to
the showing of "good moral character," including convictions for
aggravated felonies, controlled substances offenses, firearms offenses
and crimes of domestic violence.'°
Two forms of waivers of inadmissibility exist under § 212(h) of
the INA. As a defense from removal, non-residents with an immigrant
visa available to them may apply for residency and waive criminal
grounds of inadmissibility including most crimes involving moral tur-
pitude, convictions of multiple crimes, prostitution, and a single con-
viction of possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana." In its
second form, permanent residents of seven years may re-acquire their
residency and waive the same offenses, unless their conviction could
be categorized as an aggravated felony.' 2 In both forms of § 212(h)
the applicant must also meet a threshold requirement of showing that
4. See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f) (2007); INA § 212(c) (1996) (repealed 1996).
5. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f), 69 Fed. Reg. 57826-35 (Sept. 28, 2004); see generally INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
6. See INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000); see also INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
7. See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f), INA § 212(c) (repealed 1996).
8. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000).
9. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2000).
10. INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2000).
11. See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
12. Equal protection arguments to the latter have failed, despite permanent
residents having more restrictions than non-residents. See Moore v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d
919 (11th Cir. 2001).
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denial and deportation would cause extreme hardship to a spouse,
child, or parent.13 In each of the forms of relief, once the primafacie
case and any required standard of hardship is met, the alien must also
show that she warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. 14
In order to provide the framework for an equitable application of dis-
cretionary relief, the Board [of Immigration Appeals] has enunciated
factors relevant to the issue of whether ... relief should be granted as a
matter of discretion. Among the factors deemed adverse to a respon-
dent's application have been the nature and underlying circumstances
of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant
violations of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a crimi-
nal record, and if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness, and the pres-
ence of other evidence indicative of a respondent's bad character or
undesirability as a permanent resident of this country ...."
Favorable considerations have been found to include such factors as
family ties within the United States, residents of long duration in this
country (particularly when the inception of residence occurred while
the respondent was of young age), evidence of hardship to the respon-
dent and family if deportation occurs, service in this country's Armed
Forces, a history of employment, the existence of property or business
ties, evidence of value and service to the community, proof of a genu-
ine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attest-
ing to a respondent's good character (e.g., affidavits from family,
friends, and responsible community representatives). 16
As outlined above, the Immigration Court does not consider any
discretionary factors or examine a respondent's individual equities
without first determining prima facie eligibility for a form of relief
from removal. Legal argument on eligibility may determine whether
the respondent is entitled to apply for relief and a subsequent balanc-
ing of her equities in the United States. Discretionary issues may
receive de novo review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The
federal courts of appeals defer to the conclusions of the BIA, unless
"manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion."17
13. See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
14. See INA § 212(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
15. In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (B.I.A. 1978) (citing In re Carrasco,
Interim Decision 2579 (B.I.A. 1977), affd on other grounds, Carrasco-Favela v. INS,
563 F.2d 1220 (5 Cir.1977); In re Edwards, 10 I. & N. Dec. 506 (B.I.A. 1963, 1964); In
re M-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 804 (B.I.A. 1949); In re V-, 11. & N. Dec. 293 (B.I.A. 1942); In
re G-, 1 1. & N. Dec. 8 (B.I.A. 1940; A.G.1940)).
16. In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584-85.
17. INA § 242(b)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2000).
[Vol. 29:203
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III. BURDEN OF PROOF AND LEGAL STANDARD FOR DIVISIBILITY OF
CRIMINAL STATUTES
After the commencement of the removal proceedings only the
Immigration Judge may terminate proceedings upon request by either
party. 8 A respondent may request termination on grounds such as:
(1) the charging document, known as the Notice to Appear, is defec-
tive; (2) there is an incongruity between the charge and the allegations;
or (3) the Department of Homeland Security has not met its burden of
proof.19 If the respondent is legally admitted to the United States, the
Department of Homeland Security (formerly Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service) must prove the alien's deportability by clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing evidence.20
A respondent arriving at a port of entry is considered an "arriving
alien" and bears the burden of proving her admissibility. Even a
returning permanent resident is considered an arriving alien if, since
her initial admission as a resident, she has been convicted of a crime
that would render her inadmissible. 2' Whether detected at a port of
entry or through other contact with law enforcement, the criminal
alien is issued the Notice to Appear and given a court date to answer to
the charges regarding the grounds of removal (deportability or
inadmissibility).22
A common procedure is that at a preliminary hearing before the
immigration court the non-citizen respondent may deny the factual
allegations, thus forcing the Department of Homeland Security to
acquire and file with the court certified copies of any criminal records
necessary to substantiate the factual grounds of removal. 23 Alterna-
tively, the respondent may concede to the factual accuracy of the
charges against her, namely that she is a non-citizen who has been
convicted of a crime.
Once the factual issues are resolved, the respondent may contest
whether the facts support a legal ground for deportability. In this case,
the court must rule on whether the respondent's violation of a crimi-
nal statute necessarily satisfies a defined category of inadmissibility or
deportability as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
18. See In re G-N-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 281 (B.I.A. 1998).
19. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
20. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a). See also UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
JUDGE BENCHBOOK, vol. 2, at 605 (4th ed).
21. INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (2000).
22. INA § 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2000).
23. INA § 240(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2000).
2007] 207
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The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that where a statute is
divisible, e.g., when it describes some conduct that will support find-
ing an immigration violation and some that will not, a look beyond the
statute to the record of conviction "and to other documents admissible
as evidence in proving a criminal conviction" is required in order to
determine whether the offense in which the respondent was convicted
was an aggravated felony.2 4 The record of conviction is comprised of a
narrow, specific set of documents and can include the charging docu-
ment, plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit fac-
tual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.25
In analyzing grounds of removal, courts apply the "categorical"
and "modified categorical" approaches.26 The categorical approach
looks only to the structure of the statute of conviction and establishes
whether a respondent convicted under that statute must be subject to
an immigration consequence. 27 If the statute of conviction criminal-
izes conduct that both is and is not considered an enumerated offense,
the court employs a modified categorical approach by conducting "a
limited examination of documents in the record of conviction to deter-
mine if there is sufficient evidence to conclude that a defendant was
convicted of the elements of the generically defined crime even though
his or her statute of conviction was facially overinclusive. ''28
Immigration Courts are constrained by the principle of "not look-
ing behind a record of conviction. "29 By limiting examination to the
record of conviction, the courts prevent the parties from presenting
any and all possible evidence bearing on the conduct leading to the
conviction.30 This preserves judicial economy and assists in a stream-
lined adjudication consistent with the settled proposition that an
Immigration Judge cannot adjudicate guilt or innocence. 3' Thus a
respondent in Immigration Court cannot contest that he was not actu-
ally guilty of a crime to which he pled guilty. Similarly, the respondent
receives the benefit of any plea bargain in which he pleas to a non-
24. In re Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709, 714 (B.I.A. 1999).
25. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); see also Notash v.
Gonzales, 427 F.3d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 2005).
26. See United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); see
also Chang v. INS, 307 F.3d 1185, 1189-92 (9th Cir. 2002).
27. Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189-92.
28. Id. at 1189.
29. In re Pedro Aricio Pichardo-Sufren, 211. & N. Dec. 330 (B.I.A. 1996); see INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
30. See sources cited supra note 29.
31. See sources cited supra note 29.
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deportable offense, regardless of the underlying facts of his conduct.32
The following discussion addresses how a carefully calculated plea
agreement may ensure that the criminal resolution minimizes future
immigration consequences.
A. Historical Focus: Pichardo and Sweetser
The analysis of the legal ground for removal mandates a focus on
an alien's conviction rather than his actual conduct. This standard is
borne out in In re Pichardo, a Board of Immigration Appeals decision
from 1996.33 In Pichardo, the respondent had multiple convictions,
including a 1993 conviction for possession of cocaine and a 1988 con-
viction for possession of a weapon in violation of New York Penal Law
section 265.02. 34 Based on the cocaine conviction, Pichardo was
deportable as an aggravated felon, but since his conviction predated
April 24, 1996, he was eligible for a waiver under former § 212(c) of
the INA.35
The weapons violation also led the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) to allege that Pichardo was also deportable under
former § 241(a)(2)(C) of the INA as an alien convicted of a firearms
offense.3 6 This allegation was more problematic for him since it was
not waivable under former INA § 212(c).37 As discussed above, the
INA § 212(c) waiver is only available if the ground of deportability has
32. See sources cited supra note 29.
33. In re Pichardo, 21 1. & N. Dec. 330 (B.I.A. 1996).
34. Id. at 331-32.
35. But see Lopez v. Gonzalez, No. 05-547, (S. Ct. Dec. 5, 2006) (finding that
possession without intent to distribute may not satisfy the aggravated felony ground
found at INA §101(a)(43)(B), thus rendering many drug convictions non-aggravated
felonies and making respondents, even with post-April 24, 1996, convictions eligible
for some forms of relief from removal, including Cancellation of Removal). This is a
marked charge from prior controlling precedent in most circuits which held that the
only waivable controlled substance violation was for one conviction of simple
possession of marijuana.
36. Recodified at INA § 237(a)(2)(C) (2006).
37. A strategy for addressing this phenomenon was approved in In re Gabryelsky,
20 I. & N. 750 (B.I.A. 1993), and followed in In re Azurin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 695 (B.I.A.
2005). Eligible respondents can "stack waivers" by simultaneously applying for
§ 212(c) and adjustment of status, possibly also with a § 212(h) waiver in order to
waive a crime not waivable under § 212(c). Perhaps paradoxically, since the firearms
offense was not a ground of inadmissibility (and therefore not waivable under
§ 212(c)), it was not a direct bar to adjustment of status, although perhaps it was a
"crime involving moral turpitude" requiring a § 212(h) waiver and a showing of the
required "extreme hardship" to a qualifying relative.
20920071
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a corresponding ground of inadmissibility. 38 The "certain firearms
offenses" language of former INA § 241(a)(2)(C) is unique and has no
similar counterpart in the inadmissibility grounds at INA § 212. 3' By
comparison, controlled substances offenses have parallel sections in
both pertinent sections of the INA.4° Thus, Pichardo could only apply
for INA § 212(c) relief if he could successfully argue that his crime was
not a firearms offense.
Pichardo conceded the existence of the convictions but denied
that his conviction was for a firearms offense for immigration pur-
poses.41 He therefore contested that he was removable under INA
§ 241(a)(2)(C). 4 2 During the proceedings before the Immigration
Judge, Pichardo testified that the offense he committed involved the
use of a firearm, but denied that his conviction was for a firearms
offense.43 The INS introduced a Certificate of Disposition from the
Supreme Court, County of Bronx, New York, documenting that
Pichardo was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree.44 The Immigration Judge used this Certificate of Disposition
and Pichardo's extrinsic testimonial evidence to find him deportable.45
By its very terms, former INA § 241(a)(2)(C) renders deportable
only aliens who have been convicted of firearms violations. Thus an
alien who may have committed a firearms violation but was never con-
victed of such a violation does not fall within the purview of former
INA § 241(a)(2)(C). 46
Pichardo's record of conviction was limited to a single Certificate
of Disposition, although other documents would have been admissible
had they been submitted, including any charging document, plea
agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, or any explicit factual finding
by the trial judge.4 7 The Certificate referenced the New York statute,
but "nowhere in the record file [was] there any evidence of the particu-
lar subdivision of section 265.02 of the New York Penal Law which the
respondent was convicted of violating. 48
38. See INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
39. See discussion supra note 37; INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
40. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182; INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227.
41. Pichardo, 21 1. & N. Dec. 330 at 334.
42. Id. at 330, 334.
43. Id. at 331.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 333.
47. Id. at 334.
48. Id. at 333.
210 [Vol. 29:203
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Pichardo prevailed in arguing that section 265.02 is a "divisible"
statute encompassing both crimes that do and crimes that do not
involve firearms.49 It contains five subdivisions, the first of which
could, but may not, necessarily, involve a firearms-related possession
violation."0 For example, subsection 265.02(1) criminalizes the pos-
session of any weapon referenced in section 265.01, if the possessor
has a prior criminal record. Section 265.01 contains an extensive list
of weapons and weapons-related offenses, comprised primarily of non-
firearms offenses. 5' Under the statute, Pichardo could possibly have
49. Id. at 333, 334.
50. At the time the respondent was convicted, § 265.02 provided as follows:
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree
when:
(1) He commits the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth
degree as defined in subdivision one, two, three or five of section 265.01, and
has been previously convicted of any crime; or
(2) He possesses any explosive or incendiary bomb, bombshell, firearm
silencer, machine-gun or any other firearm or weapon simulating a machine-
gun and which is adaptable for such use; or
(3) He knowingly has in his possession a machine-gun, firearm, rifle or
shotgun which has been defaced for the purpose of concealment or
prevention of the detection of a crime or misrepresenting the identity of such
machine-gun, firearm, rifle or shotgun; or
(4) He possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession shall not, except as
provided in subdivision one, constitute a violation of this section if such
possession takes place in such person's home or place of business;
(5)(i) He possesses twenty or more firearms; or (ii) he possesses a firearm
and has been previously convicted of a felony or a class A misdemeanor
defined in this chapter within the five years immediately preceding the
commission of the offense and such possession did not take place in the
person's home or place of business.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1988).
51. Section 265.01 provides in pertinent part that a person is guilty of criminal
possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when :
(1) He possesses any firearm, electronic dart gun, gravity knife, switchblade
knife, pilum ballistic knife, cane sword, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal
knuckles, chuka stick, sand bag, sandclub, wrist-brace type slingshot or
slungshot, shirken or "Kung Fu star"; or
(2) He possesses any dagger, dangerous knife, dirk, razor, stiletto, imitation
pistol, or any other dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon with intent to
use the same unlawfully against another; or
(3) He knowingly has in his possession a rifle, shotgun or firearm in or upon
a building or grounds, used for educational purposes, of any school, college
or university, except the forestry lands, wherever located, owned and
maintained by the State University of New York college of environmental
science and forestry, . . . without the written authorization of such
educational institution; or
20071
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been convicted of possession of the following non-firearms: "elec-
tronic dart gun, gravity knife, switchblade knife, pilum ballistic knife,
cane sword, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles, chuka stick,
sand bag, sandclub, wrist-brace type slingshot or slungshot, shirken,
'Kung Fu star' . . . dagger, dangerous knife, dirk, razor, stiletto, imita-
tion pistol, or any other dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon.,
5 2
A non-citizen possessing any dangerous weapon would satisfy the
statute.
As such, the record did not compel a finding that Pichardo was
convicted of a section involving firearms. Since the charge of
deportability, was contested by him, and because the court could not
look beyond the record of conviction or use the extrinsic testimony of
Pichardo to sustain the charge, the INS failed its burden of proving
deportability for a firearms violation. Therefore, Pichardo was not
barred from applying for a waiver under former § 212(c).
Divisibility analysis was further developed in the 1999 case In re
Sweetser addressing the divisibility of Colorado Revised Statutes sec-
tions 18-6-401(1) and (7)(a)(II), in the posture of a motion to termi-
nate removal proceedings.53 Sweetser was convicted of criminally
negligent child abuse in relation to the accidental drowning of his
infant stepson in a few inches of bathwater.54 Although the coroner
ruled the death accidental, Sweetser was charged, convicted and sen-
tenced to four years imprisonment. 55 The Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) initially sought the deportation of Sweetser, a
British citizen and permanent U.S. resident of twenty-nine years, by
alleging that he had committed two crimes involving moral turpi-
tude.56  The immigration judge found that the offense lacked the
intent requirement for a crime involving moral turpitude, but instead
found Sweetser to be deportable as an aggravated felon for having been
convicted of a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18,
United States Code) for which the term of imprisonment was at least
one year.57
(5) He possesses any dangerous or deadly weapon and is not a citizen of the
United States[.]
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01 (McKinney 1998).
52. Id.
53. In re Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709 (B.I.A. 1999).
54. Id. at 710.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 710-11. Sweetser had a prior conviction for shoplifting.
57. INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F); see also Sweetser, 22 I. & N. at
710-11.
[Vol. 29:203212
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The United States Code defines "crime of violence" as
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of force against the person or property of another,
or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property
of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
5 8
INA § 101(a)(43)(F) requires that a "crime of violence" be a felony,
since it must be punished by at least one year of imprisonment.5 9 18
U.S.C. § 16(a) requires physical force to be an element of the crime.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the Board of Immigration Appeals "applies
the 'generic' or 'categorical approach' . . . [requiring] 'that the nature of
the crime ... is such that its commission would ordinarily present a
risk that physical force would be used against the person or property
of another irrespective of whether the risk develops or harm actually
occurs.'"
6 0
Under Colorado Revised Statute sections 18-6-401(1) and
(7)(a)(11), a person is guilty of child abuse:
If he causes an injury to a child's life or health or permits a child to be
unreasonably placed in a situation which poses a threat of injury to the
child's life or health. Such an offense is a class 3 felony when "a per-
son acts with criminal negligence and the child abuse results in death
to the child."
6 1
Thus, a person could be convicted under the Colorado statute for
either causing an injury via physical force or by passively creating a
dangerous situation. As such, the statute is divisible for immigration
purposes since it criminalizes both violent and non-violent behavior,
with the non-violent behaviors being non-deportable offenses under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F).62
The analysis does not stop with the identification of a divisible
statute. The INS had the burden of proving that the full record of con-
viction supported a finding that Sweetser actually was deportable for a
crime that did, in fact, involve violence. Since the Colorado statute
encompassed a "wide range of behaviors that may or may not result in
immigration consequences under the Act, the categorical approach
58. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a-b) (2006).
59. INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(F).
60. Sweetser, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 712-13 (quoting In re Alcontar, 20 I. & N. Dec.
801, 812 (B.I.A. 1994)).
61. Id. at 713 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-401(1), 7(a)(II)).
62. INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
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allows a court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction. '63 The Immi-
gration Court is obligated to resolve whether Sweetser's conduct falls
within the broad state statute by relying only on facts clearly resolved
in the criminal conviction documents.
The record in Sweetser's case established that his conviction was
based on his negligent omission of proper care and therefore did not
support a finding that violence was an essential element of the
offense. 64 The INS failed its burden of proof, and removal proceedings
were terminated.65
B. Current case examples: Jaggernauth (theft); Valansi (fraud/
embezzlement); and Fernandez-Ruiz (domestic violence)
Restrictions in available relief from removal have motivated
respondents to continue to challenge statutes as insufficient causes for
deportation. Whereas prior to 1996, a permanent resident charged as
an aggravated felon could concede removability and progress to a bal-
ancing of their equities under former INA § 212(c), a contemporary
respondent is barred from virtually all relief if considered an aggra-
vated felon.66
In 2003, Marlene Jaggernauth was issued a final order of removal
by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 67 Jaggernauth, a native and citi-
zen of Trinidad and Tobago, had lived in the United States as a perma-
nent resident since 1977, when she immigrated at the age of twelve. 68
During twenty-six years of residence, Jaggernauth was involved in two
incidences of criminal activity including grand theft in 1997 and
grand theft and resisting a merchant in 2001.69 For her second theft
offense, Jaggernauth received a sentence of one year. 70 The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Notice to Appear alleging
that she was deportable as an aggravated felon under INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on the second theft offense. DHS alleged
that the crime satisfied the aggravated felony definition at INA
§ 101(a)(43)(G) as a theft offense or burglary offense for which the
term of imprisonment was at least one year. 7 ' The DHS further
63. Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 715.
64. Id. at 710-11.
65. Id.
66. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(); INA § 212(c) (repealed 1996).
67. Jaggernauth v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2005).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1348-49.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1349.
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alleged Jaggernauth's deportability as an alien convicted of two crimes
involving moral turpitude under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii).72
The aggravated felony charge was central in Jaggernauth's case
since it rendered her ineligible for Cancellation of Removal or a waiver
under INA § 212(h). She was unable to present any of her personal
equities and was ordered deported in a brief hearing which required
only seven pages of transcript.
Jaggernauth conceded the factual allegations of her convictions in
a manner consistent with pro se respondents:
Judge to Ms. Jaggernauth:
Q. You were convicted April 24, 1997 for grand theft?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In Saint Lucie County?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You were convicted May 29th, 01, in Indian River, for grand theft
second degree and resisting a merchant?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the - Exhibit No. 2 will be the whole conviction record for
grand theft showing the probation violation, as well as the - and
you were also - you also have a record here, grand theft third
degree. In the Department of Homeland Security file, this convic-
tion record, which shows that you were sentenced to (indis-
cernible) probation for 36 months, right?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. Did you also violate probation on the second one?
A. No, sir. I completed - I got three years probation, it was done in
14 months, sir.
Q. Let me look at the conviction record.
Q. All right, ma'am, you have no objection to this. Exhibit no. 3 will
be that conviction record, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You got a one year sentence with suspended sentence, okay.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. ... So we admitted all we have (indiscernible), okay. I'm going to
have to sustain both charges, as you know. On the law, you seem
to be very well versed on doing it on your own... What I'm going
to have to do, ma'am, is I'm going to have to order you removed
from the United States.73
72. Id.
73. Transcript of Record at 10-11, In re Jaggernauth (on file with author).
2007] 215
13
Vastine: Being Careful What You Wish For: Divisible Statutes - Identifying
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Jaggernauth's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit turned on the issue of
the definition of a theft offense under INA § 101(a)(43)(G). 4 Jag-
gernauth's case could not have proceeded on appeal had she conceded
the "charges" of removability, but in her case the judge, upon conces-
sion of the factual charges, sustained the legal charges of deportability
himself. The judge assumed that grand theft would constitute a "theft
offense" aggravated felony since Jaggernauth was sentenced to one
year imprisonment, despite receiving a suspended sentence.75
The Eleventh Circuit held Florida Statute section 812.014(1) does
not exclusively constitute theft offenses, and that the record of convic-
tion did not prove that Marlene Jaggernauth had necessarily commit-
ted a theft offense.76 Under Florida Statute section 812.014(1):
[a] person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or
endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to,
either temporarily or permanently: (a) [dleprive the other person of a
right to the property or a benefit from the property [or] (b) appropriate
the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not
entitled to the use of the property.
77
Jaggernauth could therefore have appropriated, or used, the merchan-
dise, rather than intending to temporarily or permanently steal it, and
still be convicted under the Florida theft statute.7" The distinction is
significant because under BIA precedent "theft", for immigration pur-
74. Jaggernauth, 432 F.3d at 1352-53.
75. INA § 101(a)(48)(A) (The term 'conviction' means, with respect to an alien, a
formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has
been withheld, where-
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint
on the alien's liberty to be imposed.
(B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect
to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement
ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or
execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part. (emphasis
added)).
76. Jaggernauth, 432 F.3d at 1354-55.
77. Id. at 1353-54 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 812.014(1) (2001)).
78. Id. Florida courts, have consistently interpreted the section in the disjunctive,
to articulate two distinct levels of intent. See T.L.M. v. State, 755 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that "Section 812.014 requires a finding of specific
criminal intent to either (a) 'deprive' the other person of a right to the property or a
benefit therefrom or (b) 'appropriate' the property to his own use or to the use of any
person not entitled thereto").
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poses, requires intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of
ownership even if such a deprivation is less than total or permanent,
and a "glorified borrowing" is not a theft.79
Having identified that the statute is divisible, it was necessary to
determine whether Jaggernauth's record of conviction could clarify
which level of intent she possessed when committing her offense. This
required analyzing the information, plea judgment and sentence. In
Jaggernauth's case, each document incorporated the entire Florida
Statute section 812.014, without clarifying whether she was charged
and convicted under subpart (a) or (b). 80 Thus the record of convic-
tion did not prove that she was convicted under subpart (a), which was
the only section that would have necessarily required "the criminal
intent to deprive the owner of the rights and privileges of ownership"
necessary to be an aggravated felony theft offense."' Whether inadver-
tent or purposeful, Jaggernauth had successfully pled to a divisible
statute with sufficient vagueness to prevent sustaining a ground of
deportability.
By the time Jaggernauth won her argument before the Eleventh
Circuit, she had been physically deported. 2 Nonetheless, her case was
remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals to consider whether
she remained deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). This required
a further analysis of whether Fla. Stat. section 812.014(1) was necessa-
rily a crime involving moral turpitude. Additionally, Jaggernauth was
deemed eligible to apply for Cancellation of Removal since her aggra-
vated felony conviction, which barred her application, was
invalidated. 3
Valansi v. Ashcroft addresses a divisible statute situation where the
alien clearly entered her plea to an offense in a strategic manner in
order to preserve the argument that her conviction was not for an
"aggravated felony," and was consequently not a deportable offense.8 4
Valansi immigrated to the United States in 1974 when she was only
one month old and became a permanent resident of the United States
in 1990.85 Over a period of months in 1997, she embezzled more than
79. See In re V-Z-S-, 22 I & N Dec. 1338, 1346 (B.I.A. 2000) (stating that a
"glorified borrowing" of property is not a theft offense).
80. Jaggernauth, 432 F.3d at 1349.
81. V-Z-S-, 22 I. & N. at 1346; INA § 101(a)(43)(G).
82. Jaggernauth, 432 F.3d at 1350.
83. At the time of publication, Jaggernauth was scheduled for a master calendar
scheduling hearing before the Immigration Court to hear applications for relief.
84. Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203 (3rd Cir. 2002).
85. Id. at 205.
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$400,000 from a bank where she was an employee.86 She entered a
guilty plea in 1998.87
Valansi was placed in removal proceedings and was charged as an
aggravated felon. Both the immigration court and the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals sustained the aggravated felony charge and deemed
Valansi ineligible for relief from removal.88 Her guilty plea was after
the sunset of INA § 212(c). Like Jaggernauth, she was deemed statuto-
rily ineligible to apply for Cancellation of Removal under INA
§ 240A(a) based on the aggravated felony charge. Unlike Jaggernauth,
Valansi could terminate removal proceedings if she could prevail on
the argument that her conviction for embezzlement under 18 U.S.C.
§ 656 was a non-deportable violation of a divisible statute.89
Valansi was charged as deportable under the fraud provision of
the aggravated felony definition at INA § 101(a)(43)(M), which makes
deportable an alien conviction of an "offense that involves fraud or
deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000."0
Valansi was not even arguably deportable under the theft offense defi-
nition at INA § 101(a)(43)(G), since an imprisonment term of at least
one year was not imposed, as it was in Jaggernauth.9'
The Board of Immigration Appeals based its decision on a parsing
of the meaning of fraud and relied on the general meaning of embez-
zlement to support its holding that embezzlement, by its very nature,
necessarily did involve fraud.92 The argument of the BIA and Depart-
ment of Justice was:
[since] it has [been] acknowledged that, because the term "fraud" is
not defined in the INA, "it should be used in the commonly accepted
legal sense, that is, as consisting of false representations of a material
fact made with knowledge of [their] falsity and with intent to deceive
the other party. The representation must be believed and acted upon
by the party deceived to his disadvantage." 93
86. Id.
87. Id. at 205-06.
88. Id. at 206-07.
89. Jaggernauth had a second offense, rendering her deportable under INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) as an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude. Jaggernauth, 432 F.3d at 1348-49. Valansi was not deportable under INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i) since even if her crime involved moral turpitude, it did not take place
within five years of admission. Valansi, 278 F.3d at 207.
90. Valansi, 278 F.3d (quoting INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2000)).
91. See INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G); see also Jaggernauth, 432
F.3d 1346.
92. Valansi, 278 F.3d at 209-10.
93. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
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As discussed in Valansi, 18 U.S.C § 656 on its face is not divisible and
does not clearly enunciate a requirement of fraud.94 However, prece-
dent in the Third Circuit has preserved a five-factor analysis for satisfy-
ing the embezzlement offense, essentially preserving an earlier
definition of 18 U.S.C. § 656.91 As such, the elements necessary to be
established for Valansi's conviction were: "(1) the defendant was an
employee, (2) of a federally connected bank, (3) who took cash or
other assets, (4) in the custody or care of the bank, (5) with the intent
to injure or defraud the bank. 96
It is the fifth element that is the basis of Valansi's successful case
theory. The fraud ground for an aggravated felony requires "fraud or
deceit," but under the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 656, it is possible
to be found guilty when only intending to "injure," not to defraud or
deceive. 97
94. Id. at 209-11; see also 18 U.S.C. § 656 (2000). Theft, embezzlement, or
misapplication by bank officer or employee:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of, or connected in any
capacity with any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, depository institution
holding company, national bank, insured bank, branch or agency of a foreign
bank, or organization operating under section 25 or section 25(a) of the
Federal Reserve Act, or a receiver of a national bank, insured bank, branch,
agency, or organization or any agent or employee of the receiver, or a Federal
Reserve Agent, or an agent or employee of a Federal Reserve Agent or of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, embezzles, abstracts,
purloins or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds or credits of such
bank, branch, agency, or organization or holding company or any moneys,
funds, assets or securities intrusted to the custody or care of such bank,
branch, agency, or organization or holding company or to the custody or care
of any such agent, officer, director, employee or receiver, shall be fined not
more than $ 1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both; but if
the amount embezzled, abstracted, purloined or misapplied does not exceed
$1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
95. See Valansi, 278 F.3d at 209-10.
96. Id. at 210. (stating that "[tihe predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 656 explicitly
enunciated the last element, the intention to injure or defraud the bank, but the 1948
revision omitted this language. Nevertheless, Golden v. United States, 318 F.2d 357
(1st Cir. 1963), and Seals v. United States, 221 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1955), held that this
revision did not change the meaning or substance of the existing law. In Schmidt we
cited Golden and Seals for the proposition that an intent to injure or defraud, 'while no
longer explicitly required by the statute, is still considered an essential element of the
crime. [United States v. Schmidt, 471 F.2d 385, at 386 (3d Cir. 1972)]"').
97. Id. at 211. ("[T]he mens rea element under § 656 may also be established by
proof of an 'intent to injure.' The plain meaning of the term 'injure' is 'to do an
injustice to,' 'to harm, impair or tarnish the standing of,' or 'to inflict material damage
or loss on.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1164. Acting with the
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With divisibility established, there is still a possibility of
deportability under the embezzlement statute. In order to resolve the
issue, the court must address the full record of conviction in order to
determine whether Valansi was convicted under the deportable or non-
deportable section of the statute.98
Much to the consternation of the dissenting judge, Valansi had
very informed criminal defense counsel. This ensured that Valansi
pled to a charge with the necessary vagueness to avoid satisfying the
aggravated felony definition.99 Her counsel then instructed the trial
court that her plea was for intentionally depriving a bank of its prop-
erty, with the intent to injure the bank.'0° The property, in the form of
unprocessed checks, was worthless to Valansi, but she appropriated
the property nonetheless. 10 ' The indictment appeared to represent a
charge of "injure and defraud," but her guilty plea was explicitly only
to the "injure" element, which was sufficient to sustain the
conviction. 102
intent to injure does not require 'false representations of a material fact made with
knowledge of [their] falsity and with intent to deceive the other party,' Matter of GG, 7
I. & N. Dec. at 164, or 'a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a
material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.' Black's Law Dictionary
670 (7th ed. 1999). Nor does it require deception, which is defined as causing another
to believe what is false. Thus,. a conviction under § 656 establishing only that the
defendant acted with an intent to injure his or her employer is not an offense that
'involves fraud or deceit' under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)").
98. Id. at 211, n. 7. ("We agree that the Government may establish that the
accused acted with 'intent to injure or defraud' by offering proof that he or she
'knowingly participated in a deceptive or fraudulent transaction.' However, we also
believe that element could be satisfied by proof that the defendant acted with merely
an intent to injure his or her employer. Under the latter circumstance, a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 656 does not, in our view, necessarily involve fraud. That depends
on how the conviction under § 656 unfolds.").
99. Valansi, 278 F.3d at 218 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 221-22.
101. Id. at 220.
102. Id. at 214-15. ("A federal grand jury returned an indictment [against Valansi]
charging that, 'with intent to injure and defraud the Bank, [she] knowingly and
willfully embezzle[d] and purloine[d] .. .moneys, funds, credits, and assets belong to
the Bank and intrusted [sic] to her custody and care,' in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656.
We therefore decline to limit our inquiry to the charge as stated in the indictment. ...
We instead examine the entire context of Valansi's conviction, including not only the
offense as charged in the indictment, but also as explained to her and confirmed by
the District Court during the plea colloquy .... When the District Court asked the
Government to read the elements of Valansi's crime into the record during the plea
colloquy, the Government included as a necessary element that Valansi 'acted with the
intent to injure or defraud the bank.' The District Court then asked a series of
questions with the goal of confirming that Valansi's conduct conformed to the
[Vol. 29:203
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The record of Valansi's guilty plea reveals the following discussion
regarding her intent:
THE COURT: What everybody is telling me is . . . [t]he taking
meant an intent to deprive.
MR. PASCARELLA: That's correct.
THE COURT: That's what Miss Valansi is admitting to?
MR. PASCARELLA: That's correct.
BY THE COURT:
Q Is that correct, Ms. Valansi?
A Yes.
Q You are saying it is, yes, I took it - I took them, I intended to
deprive the bank of them, but I'm not going to say that I also never
intended to return them. Is that fair to say?
A Correct.
Q Is there anything else that you wish to add in terms of my
understanding of what you're admitting to on the issue of checks?
A No, ma'am. 10
3
The Third Circuit could not "conclude, after scrutinizing the
entire plea colloquy and record, that Valansi knowingly pled guilty to
embezzlement with the specific intent to defraud."'1 4 The court can-
didly wrote that the role of informed criminal and immigration coun-
sel was central to its interpretation of Valansi's plea. 10 5 Since the
statute was divisible, and Valansi had counsel, the court could not
believe that Valansi actually would have pled to the deportable side of
the statute.1 6 The court stated that "Valansi, advised by experienced
immigration counsel, wanted strongly to avoid subjecting herself to
deportation as a result of her plea. Not conceding this alternative ele-
ment of embezzlement allowed her both a way to plead affirmatively to
the crime and to offer an argument to elude deportation." 107 Although
the dissent characterized this as merely "a clever bit of lawyering that
was not picked up on by the government or the District Judge," Valansi
was entitled to the benefit of her well-crafted plea and was conse-
quently not deportable.'1 8
elements charged. Valansi's responses demonstrate the intent to injure her employer by
depriving it of its property. But never do they demonstrate clearly that Valansi's
specific intent was to defraud the bank.")
103. Valansi, 278 F.3d at 216.
104. Id. at 217.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 218.
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From the examples discussed above, a practitioner may draw cer-
tain conclusions. Knowing from Pichardo that extrinsic evidence,
including the alien's own admission in testimony, is not admissible to
sustain a ground of removability, the criminal attorney may build a
record that is for a lesser, or vague offense.' 0 9 However, the lesser
offense is not necessarily an improvement for immigration purposes.
Pichardo's plea was to the more severe, but divisible, New York statute
section 265.02.110 Since section 265.02 referenced the lesser section
265.01, Pichardo could plea to either, so long as the record of convic-
tion did not show that he was specifically charged with a firearm
offense."'
Valansi strategically looked at the elements of her criminal
charges, and identified and pled guilty to the one charge that had a
divisible statute containing the one non-deportable option, given that
she was caught with over $400,000 in embezzled bank property." 12
Unlike Pichardo, Valansi could expect a detailed record of conviction
to be forwarded to the Immigration Court, and the initial charge was
specifically for both the deportable and non-deportable sides of the
statute. By carefully entering a plea to the non-deportable offense, she
could protect her immigration status. She then could suffer any puni-
tive consequences, knowing that deportation would not be a collateral
consequence of her specific criminal conviction.
Jaggernauth was charged with language that tracked the Florida
theft statute. 1 3 She pled guilty to the offense, and the record of con-
viction consistently made clear the statute she had violated.' 1 4
Appearing pro se before the immigration court she admitted that the
convictions occurred. Finally, with counsel on appeal, she was able to
argue that the clear record of conviction could have been for an offense
that did not satisfy the BIA's definition of a theft offense." 5 In other
cases, it may be possible to continue making guilty pleas to the Florida
theft statute either generally, as Jaggernauth did, or specifically to the
"appropriating" language deemed non-deportable.
109. See generally In re Pichardo, 21 1. & N. Dec. 330, 336 (B.I.A. 1996).
110. Id. at 332-33.
111. Id.
112. Valansi, 278 F.3d at 205.
113. Jaggernauth v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2005).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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C. Trends in Analyzing "Crimes of Violence"
While Sweetser clearly was not convicted of a violent crime,1 16 it
is important to consider the possible consequences for any plea. His
conduct was neither intentional nor active, as it was a breach of his
duty of care. 1 1 7 Recent cases have followed involving accidental
deaths and apparent acts of violence. Most instructive may be Leocal v.
Ashcroft, which involved the Florida statute for driving under the influ-
ence and thereby causing severe bodily injury." 8 In Leocal, the
Supreme Court held that a "crime of violence" requires a "higher mens
rea than merely accidental or negligent conduct."' 19 As a consequence
of Leocal, circuits and the BIA must now consider whether other vio-
lent crimes in which a victim is injured are necessarily "crimes of
violence."
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently held in Fernandez-Ruiz v.
Gonzales that an Arizona conviction for domestic violence is not neces-
sarily a "crime of domestic violence" for immigration purposes under
INA § 237(a)(2)(E).120 The court analyzed the Arizona Revised Statute
section 13-1203(A)(1) which states that [a] person commits assault by:
[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing any physical injury to
another person." 121 The court held that under the categorical
approach, "without regard to the particular facts of Fernandez-Ruiz's
116. In re Sweetser, 22 1. & N. Dec. 709 (B.I.A. 1999).
117. Id. at 710-11.
118. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
119. Id. at 2.
120. Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006); see also INA
§ 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
INA § 237(a)(2)(E) Crimes of domestic violence, stalking, or violation of
protection order, crimes against children.
(i) Domestic violence, stalking, and child abuse. Any alien who at any
time after admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of
stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment is
deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term "crime of domestic
violence" means any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18)
against a person committed by a current or former spouse of the person, by
an individual with whom the person shares a child in common, by an
individual who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the person as a
spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the person under
the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense
occurs, or by any other individual against a person who is protected from
that individual's acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the
United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local
government.
121. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1203(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
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offense," it must ask whether the "full range of conduct" proscribed by
the statutes under which Fernandez-Ruiz was convicted meets the defi-
nition of a crime of domestic violence. 122 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that under Leocal, the 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requirement that "force be
used 'against' someone or something suggested that crimes of violence
require 'a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental
conduct.' "123 Thus, Fernandez-Ruiz's conduct, which could have been
merely reckless under the statute, is not categorically a crime of
domestic violence under INA § 237(a)(2)(E). Under the modified cate-
gorical approach, the court found that nothing in the record of convic-
tion could demonstrate that Fernandez-Ruiz had committed his
offense knowingly or intentionally 124 and therefore did not find him
deportable under the domestic violence provision of INA
§ 237(a)(2)(E).1 25 In response, the dissent began its criticism of the
majority's decision with the succinct opening salvo of "[mien do not
beat their wives by accident."' 126
D. Case Example - Conspiracy, Fraud, or Theft?
Given the myriad state and federal criminal statutes, immigration
defense counsel will likely be challenging divisible statutes for the fore-
seeable future. A recent non-precedent decision illustrates some of the
possibilities involved in a federal embezzlement conspiracy, and how
proper coordination between criminal and immigration counsel can
result in placing a non-citizen in the strongest position for contesting
removability. 127
122. Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1125.
123. Id. at 1127 (quoting Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9) (emphasis in Leocal).
124. Id. at 1132.
125. Id. at 1135.
126. Id. at 1136 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) ("Blind to this truth, the majority ignores
the realities of domestic violence and disregards congressional intent to hold that an
Arizona domestic violence conviction is not a "crime of domestic violence" for
purposes of a federal immigration law. The majority's hypertechnical analysis
stretches the categorical approach [of Taylor] to absurdity and misreads [Leocal] as
barring all crimes involving the reckless use of force from qualifying as "crimes of
violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16.) (internal citations omitted).
127. The following discussion relates to a case represented by the author. The
author's representation occurred during the time the respondent was considering
entering a plea in the criminal prosecution and later subsequent to the initiation of
removal proceedings. The divisibility argument was made before the immigration
court. The judge found divisibility and terminated proceedings. There are no
references to an appellate record or transcript of proceedings because the case was not
appealed. The respondent's name has been changed to protect confidentiality.
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Respondent, Mr. R-, a native and citizen of Guyana, was granted
lawful permanent residency in the United States in 1971. Mr. R- and
several others were charged in 2004 for criminal activity involving a
conspiracy to embezzle approximately $17,000 in federal funds desig-
nated for a Section 8 housing project. Mr. R- was charged on four sepa-
rate counts in a federal indictment.
After consulting immigration counsel, Mr. R- negotiated and
entered into a plea agreement, admitting to only one count of the
indictment, titled "Conspiracy to Steal Government Funds." However,
this lengthy count of the indictment described in detail conduct possi-
bly including embezzlement, theft and fraud.
The crime in Mr. R-'s plea agreement was referenced as "conspir-
acy to steal money of the United States and conspiracy to steal federal
funds . . .in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371."
The judgment was subsequently entered in Mr. R-'s case, describing
the nature of the convicted offense as "Conspiracy to embezzle public
money and to embezzle program funds." As a consequence of the plea
agreement, Mr. R- was sentenced to three years probation. In 2006, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Mr. R- a Notice to
Appear and took him into custody.
This case presents an inconsistent record of conviction. Unlike
the cases of Jaggernauth and Pichardo, where the record of conviction
consistently tracked and restated the criminal statute, Mr. R-'s record
of conviction contained different terminology in the indictment, plea
and judgment.'12- Although DHS bears the burden of proof to demon-
strate deportability, defense counsel must be prepared to argue all of
the possible interpretations of the record.
Before an immigration judge, Mr. R- successfully argued that he
was not subject to removal since he was not convicted of a crime that
constituted either "theft" or "fraud" aggravated felonies under the
INA.129 Mr. R- needed to prevail on this argument in order to be
released from immigration custody and to terminate his proceed-
ings. 130 He would have been barred from all discretionary relief if he
was found to be an "aggravated felon," since the conviction was eight
years after the revocation of INA § 212(c). Previously, this section pro-
128. SeeJaggernauth, 432 F.3d 1346; see also Pichardo, 21 1. & N. Dec. 330.
129. INA §§ 101(a)(43)(G), (M), 8 U.S.C. § 1101. Mr. R- was sentenced only to
probation. Thus, he did not have the requisite one year of imprisonment to satisfy INA
§101(a)(43)(G).
130. As an aggravated felon, Mr. R- was subject to the mandatory detention
provisions of INA § 236(c).
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vided the only form of relief that could waive aggravated felonies com-
mitted by lawful permanent residents."'
Mr. R- was convicted under the first portion of the first paragraph
of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which states:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspir-
acy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such
misdemeanor. 132
The federal conspiracy statute was favorable to Mr. R- since it was
divisible on its face and even divisible in its title, offering the possibili-
ties of conviction for either conspiring "to commit any offense against
the United States", or "to defraud the United States . . . . "'33 Although
the second part of the first paragraph of the statute could encompass a
crime involving fraud and thereby trigger the fraud provision under
the Act's definition of aggravated felony, 18 U.S.C. § 371 is a divisible
statute and reflects as much even in its title of "Conspiracy to commit
offense or to defraud United States. ' 134 When Mr. R- pleaded guilty
and was adjudicated guilty of this charge, he specifically pleaded guilty
only to "conspiracy to steal government funds." In doing so, he strate-
gically admitted an offense that could only relate to the first part of the
statute's language, which was a generic "offense against the United
States."
Mr. R-'s conviction was for the offense of conspiracy, which neces-
sarily implies or encompasses additional criminal goals or activity.
Furthermore, conspiracy is specifically incorporated into the aggra-
vated felony definition at INA § 101(a)(43)(U), which makes an aggra-
vated felony "an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense
described" in INA §§ 101(a)(43)(A)-(T). 135
The judgment in Mr. R-'s criminal case indicates that he was adju-
dicated guilty for the crime of "conspiracy to embezzle public money
and to embezzle program funds." Although the "embezzle" language
may imply a fraud component, a closer examination of the statutory
131. See INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U).
[Vol. 29:203226
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss2/3
BEING CAREFUL WHAT You WISH FOR
construction of the crime as well as a review of the record of conviction
as a whole demonstrated otherwise. The indictment in the case, in
detailing the acts of the conspirators referred to two statutes, 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 and 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), each discussed below.
The full language of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (emphasis added) is as
follows:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use
or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of
any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of
any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being
made under contract for the United States or any department or
agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it
to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, pur-
loined or converted -
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both; but if the value of such property ... does not exceed the sum of
$1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.
The word "value" means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either
wholesale or retail, whichever is greater.
1 36
The disjunctive language between paragraphs indicates divisibility of
the statute. The disjunctive language within each paragraph further
distinguishes deportable and non-deportable conduct.
Based on the first paragraph of this statute, Mr. R- may not have
been convicted of embezzling, but could have instead been convicted
of stealing, purloining, or knowingly converting. In addition, as indi-
cated by the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 641, he may not have
been guilty of any of the aforementioned acts at all, but rather guilty of
receiving, concealing, or retaining with an "intent to convert."'137 As
discussed above, Valansi established the distinction between embez-
zling with the intent to defraud and embezzling with intent to injure,
which possibly includes converting the property to a use other than
the basis of the original legal possession. 138 Therefore, even if the
judgment in this case accurately reflected that Mr. R- was guilty of
"conspiracy to embezzle," he could not categorically be deemed con-
victed of a fraud crime since his actions may have involved an intent to
convert, but not an intent to defraud.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000) (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. See sources cited supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) does not clearly state whether
fraud was an element of the crime for which Mr. R- was convicted:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this
section exists-
(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian
tribal government, or any agency thereof-
(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without
authority knowingly converts to the use of any person
other than the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies,
property that-
(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control
of such organization, government, or agency[.] 139
Again, under the language of the statute, Mr. R- could have also
stolen or knowingly converted property, but not necessarily embezzled
or obtained it by fraud. The language of the instant statute does not
provide certainty as to whether he was convicted of a crime involving
fraud, but demonstrates, consistent with the indictment and plea
agreement, that his conviction involved a conspiracy to steal and not a
conspiracy to commit fraud.
Consequently, Mr. R- successfully argued that he was adjudicated
guilty for only that portion of 18 U.S.C. § 371 involving "conspiracy to
commit offense," as distinguished from "conspiracy to commit fraud."
Mr. R- contended that his conviction, as referenced by the various
admissible documents which comprise the record of conviction, con-
sisted of "conspiracy to steal government funds," "conspiracy to steal
money of the United States," and "conspiracy to steal federal
funds."'140 Accordingly, the immigration judge found that Mr. R- was
not subject to removal under any provision of the INA since the statute
under which he was convicted was divisible and the admissible evi-
dence indicated that there was no element of fraud in Mr. R-'s
conviction.
Further, Mr. R- was not subject to removal under the theft provi-
sion of the aggravated felony definition found at INA § 101(a)(43)(G).
As in Jaggernauth, this section renders a respondent convicted of cer-
tain theft offenses removable pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). 14 1
However, in order to be subject to this provision of the Act, an impris-
onment term of at least one year must have been imposed for that theft
139. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000) (emphasis added).
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
141. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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or burglary offense. 142 Mr. R- had negotiated a plea agreement and
was sentenced to three years probation and no term of imprisonment.
Accordingly, DHS was prohibited from bringing charges seeking his
removal as an aggravated felon as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(G).
With no basis of deportability established, the immigration judge ter-
minated proceedings and Mr. R- was released from custody.
IV. CONCLUSION
Those non-citizens convicted of a deportable offense and released
from criminal custody after October 9, 1998, will likely be subject to
mandatory detention. 143 They therefore will be contesting their remov-
ability from the discomfort and inconvenience of an immigration
detention center or contracted prison facility. Immigration detention
exerts pressure on respondents comparable to the pressure they felt
upon their initial arrest and the stress of the criminal process. The
detainee knows that if she loses her case before the immigration judge,
detention will continue while she appeals to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Subsequently, she risks being deported during the pendency
of any federal appeal. Even if the detainee wins in the federal forum,
she faces procedural obstacles to re-entry into the United States and
possible additional immigration charges. 144
Unfortunately for many non-citizens, the principle of "not looking
behind the conviction" seals their fate, for they may fall into a category
of inadmissibility or deportability that is not waivable under the INA.
Immigration courts, for efficiency purposes, are bound by the record
of conviction and must order removal when it is justified. As long as
the conviction is final, the Immigration Court is bound by the judg-
ment of the criminal court.145
142. Id.
143. Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, Executive Assoc. Comm'r for Field
(July 12, 1999), reprinted in 76 No. 27 Interpreter Releases 1082, 1083 (July 19,
1999). October 9, 1998 was the expiration of the Transitional Period Custody Rule,
under which the mandatory detention provision of INA § 236(c) was held in abeyance
due to inadequate space to hold the required detainees.
144. As noted above, Jaggernauth was physically deported and was allowed to
reenter to continue her removal proceedings following her victory in federal court.
However, she remained subject to mandatory detention because of her multiple
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
However, as a non-aggravated felon, she was then eligible for Cancellation of Removal
under INA § 240A(a).
145. See generally In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224 (B.I.A. 1998); In re Thomas, 21 1.
& N. Dec. 20 (B.I.A. 1995) (stating that a judgment appealed to the first appellate level
is not final).
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Some respondents in immigration court have the option to pursue
post-conviction relief and thus may be able to vacate their conviction
and terminate proceedings. 14 6 It is essential for the criminal defense
attorney and immigration attorney to collaborate in the timing of this
attempt. For example, if the conviction is vacated and the client is re-
charged and re-tried, it may be an option to plea to a divisible statute
or to a clearly non-removable offense. Also, for older convictions,
being re-charged and convicted may eliminate the availability of relief
under INA § 212(c), as any plea and conviction will necessarily occur
after April 24, 1996.
Many criminal non-citizens must face the immigration judge
knowing that they cannot appeal or vacate their plea. Their only argu-
ment may be the inapplicability or over-breadth of the charges against
them. The purpose of this paper is not to merely describe how to ana-
lyze the statute for divisibility and discuss cases where this technique
has been successful for the non-citizen. The real goal is to use the case
examples to illustrate strategic possibilities when criminal counsel,
immigration counsel, and the respondent undertake long-term analy-
sis and make informed decisions when deportation is a possible con-
sequence of criminal activity.
The use of legal imagination is more effective when a difference
may be made and the criminal attorney may negotiate the least damag-
ing outcome. Ms. Valansi and Mr. R- took steps at the criminal trial
level to minimize future consequences. Accepting a long period of
probation may be advantageous compared to a shorter jail term.
Moreover, the attorney may negotiate a plea for a non-deportable (or
arguably non-deportable) offense in exchange for cooperation in
another matter.
The possibilities are vast for crafting a potentially non-deportable
solution, given the proper legal expertise and patience by the client.
The goal is for the arrested non-citizen to accept a plea or litigate only
after knowing the long-term consequences of her decision. Most
would agree that suffering short-term in legal limbo at the initiation of
146. See In re Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878 (B.I.A. 2006) (stating that a conviction
vacated on due process grounds because of a court's failure to advise the defendant of
the Immigration consequences of plea no longer constitutes a conviction for
immigration purposes); Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating
that where a defendant is not advised of immigration consequences of a Florida plea, a
court, in determining whether a vacated conviction remains a basis for removability,
must look at records to determine if vacated on substantive grounds, as opposed to
expunged via a rehabilitative statute).
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criminal proceedings and finding a livable solution is less disastrous
than living a life deported, away from all that is loved in their adopted
country.
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